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SCI 236 AGARDograph 
Part Two  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Armstrong Flight Research Center Annex 
 
1. Organization 
1.1. Title 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Armstrong Flight 
Research Center (AFRC) 
1.2. Location 
Edwards Air Force Base, Edwards, CA and United States Air Force (USAF) 
Plant 42, Palmdale, CA 
1.3. Nature of Flight Test Activity 
NASA AFRC is a United States government entity that conducts the integration 
and operation of new and unproven technologies into proven flight vehicles as 
well as the flight test of one-of-a-kind experimental aircraft. AFRC also maintains 
and operates several platform aircraft that allow the integration of a wide range 
of sensors to conduct airborne remote sensing, science observations and 
airborne infrared astronomy. To support these types of operations AFRC has the 
organization, facilities and tools to support the experimental flight test of unique 
vehicles and conduct airborne sensing/observing.. The current aircraft fleet 
encompasses a wide range of aircraft, including remotely piloted and 
autonomous vehicles and consists of: 
 F-18A/B 
 F-15B/D 
 T-34C 
 TG-14 
 G-III 
 B-200 (KingAir) 
 DC-8 
 B-747SP 
 ER-2 
 RQ-4 
 MQ-9 
 Wide range of small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180002148 2019-08-29T17:41:12+00:00Z
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2. Background 
AFRC was originally established in 1946 as the High Speed Flight Research Station. 
A contingent of engineers, pilots, maintainers and administrative support personnel 
were deployed to Muroc Army Air Base (now Edwards Air Force Base) from the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics Langley Memorial Aeronautical 
Laboratory to support the first supersonic research flights of the X-1 rocket-powered 
aircraft. The organization grew and expanded its capabilities over the years as it 
continued to support the development of and research associated with aerospace 
research vehicles. The staff currently consists of 535 civil servants and 
approximately 600 contractor personnel. In 2006, AFRC established a long-term 
lease with Los Angeles World Airports for Building 703 located adjacent to USAF 
Plant 42 (Palmdale Airport). The majority of the airborne remote sensing and 
airborne astronomy is accomplished from this facility. Through agreements with the 
US Department of Defense (DOD), AFRC maintains access to the airfields and 
airspace that allows the conduct of a full range of aeronautical flight research and 
test from both locations. Dryden Aeronautical Test Range (DATR) supplies a 
comprehensive set of resources for the control and monitoring of flight activities, 
real-time acquisition and reduction of research data, and effective communication of 
information to flight and ground crews. 
3. Regulatory Framework 
3.1. External 
3.1.1. NASA has been granted the authority by US Federal legislation to 
provide airworthiness certification, outside of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and DOD systems, for all aircraft and UAS operated 
under its purview. The NASA airworthiness certification process provides 
the opportunity to conduct flight operations both domestically and 
internationally 
3.1.2. It is a requirement of NASA Headquarters that the Center maintain a 
Quality Management System. AFRC’s Quality Management System is 
certified through the AS9100 quality system requirements. 
3.2. Internal 
To provide airworthiness certifications and review of flight test activities, the 
Center has developed a robust airworthiness and flight safety review process. 
AFRC processes used to support flight test and safety activities satisfy the 
AS9100 requirements. The overarching guidance document is AFG-7900.3-
001, Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review, Independent Review, Technical 
Brief, and Mini-Tech Brief. 
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3.3. Flight Test Policy 
NASA policy, as codified in NPR7900.3 Aircraft Operations Management, 
states: 
3.3.1. For each Center operating aircraft/UAS or procuring and/or acquiring 
aircraft/UAS services, the Center Director shall maintain a program-
independent Flight Operations Office, the specific purpose of which will be 
to plan, organize, direct, and control the operations, maintenance, 
modification, safety, and support of all Center-assigned or -contracted 
aircraft. 
3.3.2. The Center Director shall assign the Chief of the Flight Operations Office 
the authority and responsibility and provide the resources necessary to 
manage and conduct safe, effective, and efficient operations in accordance 
with NASA directives, guidance, and other applicable Federal regulations. 
3.3.3. Center Directors shall be responsible for the airworthiness and flight 
safety of all Center-assigned aircraft and UAS, including commercial aircraft 
services. 
4. Flight Test Safety Management System 
AFRC has implemented this policy through a matrix management system of Project 
Managers, Engineering, and Flight Operations, with Safety and Mission Assurance 
providing an independent assessment and support to the project team. The Center 
Director has also established the position of Center Chief Engineer who is the 
independent authority for airworthiness, flight safety and mission success. Long 
established Center practice has demonstrated that safe flight research results from 
an effective leadership team consisting of a Project Manager, a Project Chief 
Engineer (typically from the Research Engineering Directorate) and an Operations 
Engineer from the Flight Operations Directorate. The focus of the Project Manager is 
leadership of the team and responsibility for schedule and financial resources. The 
Project Chief Engineer provides leadership for the engineering team and the focus 
on the research aspects. The Operations Engineer is responsible for aircraft 
airworthiness and is the interface with the hands-on workforce in the Flight 
Operations Directorate. In total, this team owns the responsibility for the assessment 
of risks, identification of mitigations, and implementation of these mitigations. The 
Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate is a partner in this process, but also 
functions as an independent authority. The risk/hazard evaluation process is 
described in Section 6. This team is also responsible for Mission Success. AFRC’s 
Senior Leadership (Center Director and Directorate Chiefs) is engaged as described 
in Section 6. This implementation allows a small Center to manage and execute the 
broad portfolio of work described in Section 1. 
5. Organization and People 
 4 
 
5.1. Research and Engineering Directorate 
This organization is responsible for performing the research and engineering 
tasks necessary to safely and successfully accomplish the Center’s flight 
research and test mission. The Directorate is organized with seven Branches 
addressing key engineering disciplines: Systems Engineering and Integration, 
Aerodynamics and Propulsion, Dynamics and Control, Advanced Systems 
Development, Flight Instrumentation and Systems Integration, Aerostructures, 
and Research Engineering Operations 
5.2. Flight Operations Directorate 
This organization fabricates, maintains, modifies and instruments aircraft and 
flight test articles, ensures airworthiness/flight readiness and safely flies them in 
a precise manner to required test points in order to deliver highest quality data 
to the customer. The Branches in this organization include: Flight Crew Branch, 
Operations Engineering Branch, Avionics and Instrumentation Branch, 
Fabrication Branch, Life Support Branch, Maintenance Branch, Aircraft Records 
Branch, and Engineering Support Branch. 
5.3. Mission Operations Directorate 
This Directorate provides effective and efficient Simulation, Range and IT 
solutions. The Dryden Aeronautical Test Range (DATR) supplies a 
comprehensive set of resources for the control and monitoring of flight activities, 
real-time acquisition and reduction of research data, and effective 
communication of information to flight and ground crews. The primary services 
provided for safety and risk management are the aircraft simulations and the 
services and capabilities of the Dryden Aeronautical Test Range. 
5.4. Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate 
The mission of this directorate is to ensure safe operations and mission success 
while understanding and mitigating risks to the public, property and mission.  In 
addition, S&MA ensures a safe and healthy work place for employees and 
visitors.  The Branches in this organization are: Quality Assurance Branch, 
Safety and Environmental Branch, Flight Research and Test Safety Branch. 
5.5. Programs and Projects Directorate 
This Directorate leads and manages Center Project and subproject activity, 
providing the Project Management and Program Planning and Control functions. 
5.6. Mission Support Directorate 
This Directorate provides the Facilities infrastructure support, Protective 
Services, and Procurement functions that enable all of the Center’s flight test 
and operations activities. 
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6. Process and Procedure 
6.1. Flight Test Safety Review Process 
Over the past 70+ years AFRC has developed an airworthiness and flight safety 
review process that provides an efficient way to review and approve vehicle 
airworthiness while ensuring a high probability of safe operations for the flight 
test of unique aerospace technologies and vehicle configurations. This single 
process can be tailored to address the airworthiness and safety review of a wide 
variety of flight test activities, manned as well as unmanned. A risk and hazard 
management based approach is applied that promotes the safe and successful 
execution of high risk flight tests. It assesses, communicates and accepts the 
residual risks inherent in the operation and test of unique flight vehicles. 
6.2. Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Process 
6.2.1. Boards 
Flight test activities are reviewed and approved for flight by independent 
review boards. 
6.2.1.1. Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Board 
The Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Board (AFSRB) is a 
standing board of Armstrong senior leadership (Research and 
Engineering Director, Flight Operations Director, Mission Systems 
Director, Safety and Mission Assurance Director, Programs and 
Projects Director) chaired by the Center Chief Engineer who deliberate 
on the material presented and formulate a consensus-based 
recommendation to the Center Director regarding the project’s 
readiness for flight and the acceptability of residual risk. This Board is 
augmented by the Chief Test Pilot and the Aviation Safety Officer for 
piloted tests and the Range Safety Officer for UAS activities. 
6.2.1.2. Flight Readiness Review Board 
The Flight Readiness Review Board (FRRB) is an ad hoc group of 
subject matter experts fully independent of the project under review. 
The board is chartered by the Center Chief Engineer to conduct an 
independent review and assessment of the entire project and ensure 
that proper, adequate planning and preparation have been 
accomplished resulting in the project being conducted in an acceptable 
safe manner. The FFRB verifies that the System Safety Plan has been 
followed and that all analyses and results have been properly 
documented by the project team. They can also be charged with 
assessing the ability of the project to achieve mission success. They 
ensure that all identifiable risks have been documented, assessed, and 
are adequately controlled or properly identified as accepted risks. A key 
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element of the review at this level is constant communication between 
the FRRB, the project team and Center management. In addition to 
maintaining awareness, this allows issues to be worked early at the 
correct level. The FFRB assesses the approach and implementation in 
regard to public, ground, flight, and range safety and examines the 
project generated hazard analyses in detail, verifying that proper 
mitigations have been implemented and that reasonable residual risk 
has been identified. If deemed necessary for their assessment the 
FRRB may conduct independent analysis or simulations to compare 
with project generated results. They present their findings and 
recommendations to the AFSRB.  
6.2.1.3. Technical Briefing Board 
A standing board of Armstrong senior managers chaired by the Center 
Chief Engineer who provide a final series of peer reviews of the 
project’s plans and preparations through the execution of the project. 
The Technical Briefing, or Tech Brief, is one of the more important tools 
used by the Center to ensure the safe and efficient conduct of the flight 
test mission. Its major function is to continue the review process after 
the AFSRB has made its final recommendations and a program moves 
into the flight or test phase. There are two primary purposes for holding 
Tech Briefs. First, the individual Project Office is given the opportunity 
to present its goals and plans to a group of peers. These peers 
represent all the various disciplines at Center, with special emphasis on 
the particular areas of interest that are being explored during the 
proposed flight tests. A Project, in this way, receives the benefit of the 
experience and expertise of projects conducted previously. The peer 
review, using past experiences, is a proven way of bringing overlooked 
items to light. The second purpose of Tech Briefs is to present a current 
assessment of Project risks to the Center management team. It allows 
management to reconsider its understanding of the risks involved prior 
to each flight. This helps ensure that any risks that cannot be eliminated 
or reduced will be accepted at the appropriate level of authority and 
responsibility. The Tech Brief review should also address the data 
analysis results from previous flights of the aircraft with particular 
emphasis on envelope expansions or any unexpected results, and 
whether or not they are expected to present problems during future 
tests. These results should provide a smooth transition to the objectives 
of the proposed flight plan.  
6.2.2. Level of Review 
Early in a project’s life cycle the chair of the AFRC Airworthiness and Flight 
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Safety Review Board (AFSRB) works with the project team and Center 
management to determine the appropriate level of independent review 
required. The level of review is based upon factors such as complexity, 
criticality, visibility and level of residual risk. Four review levels are available: 
6.2.2.1. Chief Engineer Review 
For low risk, simple, non-critical tests the Center Chief Engineer, as 
AFSRB chair, may solely review the project team’s plans and 
preparations for adequacy for performance of the proposed operation 
with the necessary level of safety and clear it for flight. 
6.2.2.2. Chief Engineer with subject matter experts 
The next level of review is conducted by the Center Chief Engineer with 
a small team (2-4 people) of subject matter experts who review the 
project team’s plans and preparations for adequacy with the necessary 
level of safety and clear it for flight with a Technical Briefing. 
6.2.2.3. Airworthiness and Flight Safety Board Review 
The next higher level of review is conducted by the full AFSRB. The 
project team presents their plans and preparations to the entire AFSRB 
who determine whether the project had integrated appropriate flight 
safety and adequately assessed the residual risk of conducting the test. 
The Board presents their recommendation as to the project’s readiness 
to proceed to flight and the residual risk stance to the AFRC Director 
who either concurs or non-concurs with the AFSRBs recommendation 
for the project to flight. Final flight approval is provided through a 
Technical Briefing 
6.2.2.4. Flight Readiness Review Board Review 
The most rigorous level of review is conducted by a Flight Readiness 
Review Board who assesses the project’s plans, preparations and 
residual risk position and whether they have adequately integrated flight 
safety. The FRRB presents their assessment, findings and 
recommendations to the AFSRB who determine whether the project 
should proceed to flight. The AFSRB presents their recommendation 
and the residual risk stance to the AFRC Director who either concurs or 
non-concurs with the AFSRBs recommendation for the project to flight. 
Final flight approval is provided through a Technical Briefing 
6.2.3. Hazard Evaluation and Communication 
6.2.3.1. Hazard Review 
Hazard analysis and review is conducted throughout a project’s life 
cycle. Hazard analysis and report generation are conducted by the 
project’s system safety working group typically made up of the project’s 
lead for safety, chief engineer, operations engineer, pilot, and project 
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manager. Hazard reviews are conducted by each review board held for 
system engineering and airworthiness and flight safety reviews. 
6.2.3.2. Residual Risk 
Experimental flight often carries higher risk than operational flight. After 
all appropriate mitigations have been accomplished the residual safety 
and technical risks are documented, reviewed and communicated 
through the system engineering and airworthiness and flight safety 
reviews. 
6.2.3.3. Hazard Matrix 
There are two Center residual risk hazard action matrices (HAMs) that 
serve as the primary means of communicating safety hazard 
management classification. The purpose of these templates is to relate 
human safety hazards, loss of high-dollar value assets, and/or loss of 
mission in terms of the hazard's severity and its probability in order to 
identify the associated overall hazard risk. The HAMs identify the level 
of management approval required for actual acceptance of risks 
(accepted risks) by the solid red and red cross-hatched areas on the 
HAMs. The HAM instructions reflect the accepted, Center wording for 
hazard probability and severity classifications of mishap occurrence. 
Projects will not change the substance of the HAM presentation if it is 
planned for use as part of the Center airworthiness process without an 
approved waiver. Final hazard classifications are determined after the 
project or program has exhausted all planned corrective and controlling 
actions utilizing the Hazard Mitigation. 
6.2.3.3.1. Hazard Probability 
The probability categories are derived from NPR 8715.3, NASA 
General Safety Program Requirements. “Probability is the likelihood 
that an identified hazard will result in a mishap, based on an 
assessment of such factors as location, exposure in terms of cycles 
or hours of operation, and affected population.” The probability is 
based on the scope and duration of the risk being assessed and 
presented to Center management. The probability is determined by 
quantification (analysis/calculated), or by qualitative means with 
appropriate justification (clear rationale) for the assessment. The 
Hazard Probability categories are:  
 Frequent – Likely to occur immediately OR expected to occur 
often in the life of the project/item. Controls cannot be 
established to mitigate the risk. 
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 Probable – Probably will occur OR will occur several times in the 
life of a project/item. Controls have significant limitations or 
uncertainties. 
 Occasional – May occur OR expected to occur sometime in the 
life of a project/item, but multiple occurrences are unlikely. 
Controls have moderate limitations or uncertainties. 
 Remote – Unlikely but possible to occur OR unlikely to occur in 
the life of the project/item, but still possible. Controls have minor 
limitations or uncertainties. 
 Improbable – Improbable to occur OR occurrence theoretically 
possible, but such an occurrence is far outside the operational 
envelope. Typically robust hardware/software, operational 
safeguards, and/or strong controls are put in place with 
mitigation actions to reduce risk from a higher level to an 
improbable state. 
6.2.3.3.2. HAZARD SEVERITY 
Severity can be broken out into personal injury or loss of 
asset/mission.  Personal injury can be broadened to include death, 
disability, illness, and several categorizations of injury (life 
threatening, lost-time, minor, etc.).  Loss of asset/mission can be 
broadened to include loss of system, substantial system damage, 
minor system damage, property damage, and loss or compromise 
of mission (incomplete mission success). The Human Safety 
Hazard Severity categories are: 
CLASS I (CATASTROPHIC) A condition that may cause death or permanently disabling/life-
threatening injury. 
CLASS II (CRITICAL) A condition that may cause severe/lost time injury or occupational illness. 
CLASS III (MODERATE) A condition that may cause medical treatment for a minor injury or 
occupational illness (no lost time). 
CLASS IV (NEGLIGIBLE) A condition that could cause the need for minor first aid treatment 
(though would not adversely affect personal safety or health). 
 
The Loss of Asset/Mission Hazard Severity Categories are: 
CLASS I (CATASTROPHIC) Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of $2M or more, 
OR Crewed aircraft hull loss, OR Unexpected aircraft departure from 
controlled flight for all aircraft except when departure from controlled 
flight has been pre-briefed. 
CLASS II (CRITICAL) Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least 
$500k, but less than $2M. 
CLASS III (MODERATE) Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least $50k, 
but less than $500k. 
CLASS IV (NEGLIGIBLE) Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least $20k, 
but less than $50k 
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7. Facilities and Tools 
7.1. Flight Loads Laboratory (FLL) 
The FLL was constructed in 1964 as a unique national lab to support flight 
research and aircraft structures testing.  FLL personnel conduct mechanical-
load and thermal test of structural components and complete flight vehicles in 
addition to performing calibration tests of vehicle instrumentation ofr real-time 
determination of flight loads.  Mechanical loads and thermal conditions can be 
applied either separately or simultaneously to simulate combined thermal-
mechanical load conditions.  FLL personnel also conduct modal survey and 
structural mode interaction testing to support structures research and assess 
aircraft for flutter airworthiness. 
 
The FLL staff have expertise in ground and flight test design and operations: 
load, stress, dynamic and thermal analysis; and instrumentation and 
measurement systems development.  This expertise, coupled with a large array 
of capital equipment and advanced data acquisition and control systems, make 
the FLL and ideal laboratory for research and testing of aerospace vehicles and 
structures flying in the subsonic through hypersonic flight regimes. 
7.2. Research Aircraft Integration Facility 
AFRC maintains a simulation engineering capability that is focused on providing 
high fidelity fixed-base aerospace vehicle simulations that support research from 
concept through flight test phases of activity. This capability consists of batch, 
pilot-in-the-loop and full hardware-in-the-loop simulations.  Where necessary, 
ground assets may be extended to remotely piloted vehicles and distributed 
environments that have combinations of real and simulated vehicles, or 
combinations of real and simulated components. 
7.3. Experimental Fabrication and Repair Shop 
The AFRC Experimental Fabrication Branch is a one-stop manufacturing, 
modification, and repair center that can assist a project from initial design 
through assembly and installation. The branch consists of five shops that 
provide machining, sheet metal, tubing, welding, and composite fabrication for 
aerospace and ground requirements. The engineering technicians in the branch 
are highly skilled fabricators and experienced master craftsmen. Pro-
Engineering software is the primary CNC programming system used in the 
branch to produce complex or sophisticated parts. A production controller on 
staff will coordinate the outsourcing to offsite manufacturing facilities if the 
requirements exceed the capacity or competency of the branch. 
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7.4. Dryden Aeronautical Test Range 
Dryden Aeronautical Test Range (DATR) supplies a comprehensive set of 
resources for the control and monitoring of flight activities, real-time acquisition 
and reduction of research data, and effective communication of information to 
flight and ground crews. Precision radar provides tracking and space positioning 
information on research vehicles and other targets, including satellites. Fixed 
and mobile telemetry antennas receive real-time data and video signals from the 
research vehicle and relay this data to telemetry processing areas. The 
processed data is displayed at the engineering stations in the mission control 
center and archived in a post-flight storage area. Audio communication networks 
support research operations in the DATR, covering a broad frequency spectrum 
for transmitting and receiving voice communications and flight termination 
signals for unmanned aerial vehicles. Video monitoring provides real-time and 
recorded data for the control and safety of flight test missions. 
7.5. Subscale Flight Research Lab 
The Subscale Flight Research Lab performs rapid prototyping, development, 
and testing of one-of-a kind subscale research and training aircraft that range 
from micro scale up to 330 lbs.  The aircraft and associated support equipment 
may be manufactured entirely within the lab or may be either unmodified or 
highly modified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment or a combination of 
the two. Unique aerodynamic configurations ranging from low-speed testing of 
advanced hypersonic shapes to simple, proof-of-concept small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (sUAS) such as hand-launched gliders are often the 
focus.  Operational concepts have varied from controlling the vehicles using 
conventional Radio Controlled (R/C) systems flown from the ground with visual 
feedback to conducting missions from within a ground control station using a 
traditional stick and rudder ground based cockpit with the control signals being 
telemetered up to, and down from, the research vehicle.  The majority of the 
support tasks for Subscale Flight Research is comprised of design, fabrication, 
assembly, maintenance and R/C piloting of sUAS assets. 
8. Discussion and Observations 
NASA AFRC has honed this process over the course of 71 years of conducting flight 
test on a wide range of vehicle and experiments. There are several keys to the 
success of this process. The establishment of the Center Chief Engineer as the sole 
authority keeps the process focused while tailoring the level of review appropriately 
for the size and scope of the project. The nature of being a small Center with one 
primary mission focus (flight test) also helps maintain the focus. The use of 
independent co-workers in a process where the project and the review team share 
the mutual goals of safe flight and mission success is another key consideration. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1. AFG-7900.3-001 “Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review, Independent Review, 
Technical Brief and Mini-Tech Brief” 
9.2. AFOP-7900.3-023 “Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Process” 
9.3. AFOP-7900.3-022 “Tech Brief and Mini-Tech Brief” 
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Appendix – 9.5. Level of Review Graphic 
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Appendix – 9.6. Hazard Action Matrix (HAM) Residual Risk 
Human Safety 
 
Loss of Asset/Mission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Probability 
Severity A: Frequent B: Probable C: Occasional D: Remote E: Improbable 
I: Catastrophic           
II: Critical           
III:  Moderate           
IV: Negligible           
      
  Requires Center Director approval and may require approval by a higher authority.  These hazards are defined as "Accepted Risks." 
  Risk acceptance requires Center Director approval.  These hazards are defined as "Accepted Risks". 
  Risk acceptance requires Project Manager approval. 
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